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Abstract 
We estimate the benefits of intrastate and interstate geographic diversification for bank risk and 
return, and assess whether such benefits could be shaped by differences in bank size and 
disparities in economic conditions within states or across U.S. states. For small banks, only 
intrastate diversification is beneficial in terms of risk-adjusted returns but for very large 
institutions both intrastate and intrastate expansions are rewarding. However, in all cases the 
relationship is hump-shaped for both intrastate and interstate diversification indicating limits for 
banks of all size. Moreover, while our results indicate that the average 'very large' bank has 
already reached its optimal diversification level, the average 'small bank' could still benefit in 
terms of risk-adjusted returns from further geographic diversification. Higher economic disparity 
as measured by the dispersion in unemployment rates either across counties or states impacts the 
benefits of diversification. At initially low levels of diversification, moving to other markets with 
dissimilar economic conditions lowers the added value of diversification but it becomes more 
beneficial at higher diversification levels.  
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1. Introduction 
 
U.S. banks are not just becoming larger but also wider. The largest bank holding 
companies (BHCs) now operate across many states and many more banking markets within 
states. Similarly, smaller local banks are present in a larger number of counties than in the past. 
Compared to the vast literature on growing bank size or scale, the widening of U.S. banks and 
the potential diversification it provides has received relatively little attention. We document 
trends in geographic diversification for U.S. banks, and investigate how such diversification 
relates to bank risk and return. We contrast the effects of increasing scope—geographic 
diversification—with increasing size, or scale and account for potential diversification benefits 
due to dissimilarities in economic conditions.   
Scale and scope refer to two very different but nevertheless interrelated dimensions. 
When banks get larger by merging with another bank in the same geographic location or some 
other location with nearly coincident fluctuations in economic activity, such an increase in scale 
is expected to lower average costs and may provide diversification across products. However, it 
will not provide any benefits incurred by geographic diversification. Indeed, geographic 
diversification benefits are associated to new investment opportunities in locations with different 
economic environments and non-synchronized fluctuations in economic activity. Geographically 
focused banks are much more exposed to changes in local economic conditions even when they 
hold a more diversified loan portfolio across a larger number of local consumers. Thus, scale is 
about spreading the costs of producing assets over fixed factors of production while geographic 
diversification is about spreading assets over locations with different patterns of returns.   
To look into geographic diversification, banks can be considered as a portfolio of loans 
and improved opportunities to diversify as an upward shift in the risk-return tradeoff facing a 
banker. However, an improvement in the risk-return tradeoff will not necessarily lead to lower 
risk; depending on their preferences, some bankers may respond to the improved returns to risk-
taking by increasing risk, albeit with even greater returns. Whether overall risk goes up or down 
after diversification increases depends, in the end, on a bank’s appetite for risk. But whatever the 
actual portfolio choice along the improved risk-return tradeoff, risk-adjusted returns (i.e., returns 
per unit of risk) should be higher at more diversified banks. We therefore investigate the 
implications of geographic diversification in terms of risk and return but also more specifically in 
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terms of risk-adjusted return. We measure bank geographic diversification using the FDIC’s 
annual Summary of Deposits, wherein banks report the amount of deposits at each and every 
branch in the U.S.. We calculate diversification measures for each banking firm across different 
markets, where “markets” are defined variously as states, at one extreme, to individual MSAs 
(Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and rural counties, at the other. Using a sample of 6532 banks 
with data from 1994 to 2008, i.e. starting when diversification was allowed by the Interstate 
Banking Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) until the important changes driven by the 2008 global 
financial crisis1, we estimate the relationship between geographic diversification, on the one 
hand, and risk, returns, risk-adjusted returns and default risk, on the other. Existing work 
considers the effects of geographic diversification either on the market value of listed BHCs 
(Deng and Elyasini, 2008, Goetz et al., 2013), i.e. large institutions or focuses on small banks 
located in one state (Goetz, 2012) or small community banks (Emmons et al., 2004). By 
considering the broadest possible sample of banks, our aim is to investigate the potential benefits 
of diversification at various size levels and multiple geographic dimensions encompassing the 
case of a small bank initially operating in a single county or MSA and reaching for new business 
only a few miles away to the largest institutions spreading across states and internationally. In 
contrast to micro papers that focus on distance between headquarter and branches (Deng and 
Elyasini, 2008) or analyze the dynamics of either intrastate branching deregulation (Goetz, 2012) 
or interstate bank deregulation (Goetz et al., 2013), our aim is to account for heterogeneity in 
economic conditions within states at the county level and across states nationwide. Specifically, 
we assess how disparities in economic conditions and business cycles within or across states 
impact the risk-return outcomes of geographic expansion.  
Our results show that for small banks, only intrastate diversification is beneficial in terms 
of risk-adjusted returns but that for very large institutions both intrastate and interstate 
expansions are rewarding. However, in all cases the relationship is hump-shaped for both 
intrastate and interstate diversification indicating limits for banks of all size. Moreover, while our 
results indicate that the average 'very large' bank has already reached its optimal diversification 
level, the average 'small' bank could still benefit from further geographic diversification but only 
                                                          
1
 While we control for the years 2007 and 2008 in our estimations, we also run all our regressions by excluding 
observations from 2007 and 2008 and obtain similar findings. Major changes took place later on and therefore we 
start our investigation in 1994 to capture the diversification trends following the Interstate Banking Act of 1994 and 
do not go beyond the global financial crisis which is still a transitory period.  
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if it expands far beyond its local market. Higher economic disparity as measured by the 
dispersion in unemployment rates either across counties or states impacts the benefits of 
diversification. At initially low levels of diversification, moving to other markets with dissimilar 
economic conditions lowers the added value of diversification, but it becomes more beneficial at 
higher diversification levels. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to previous 
literature and discusses our research focus. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 our 
empirical model and results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.   Related literature and research focus 
 
In our study we focus on the U.S., where there has been a distinct shift toward more 
interstate mergers after 1994. Such a shift followed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act that enabled banks to acquire banks in another state without that state’s 
permission. In general, the laws that limited banks’ geographic reach have gradually eased over 
the last decades. Starting in the 1970s, individual states began letting banks branch across their 
own state, and groups of states, or compacts, allowed interstate bank mergers among the states in 
the compact. In 1982, BHCs were allowed (by the Garn-St. Germain Act) to buy failed banks in 
any state, regardless of state laws. Before 1994, virtually all mergers involved two banks in the 
same state, often a healthy bank buying a failing one. The Interstate Banking Act of 1994 
(Riegle-Neal) enables BHCs to buy any bank—healthy or not—in any state. Intrastate mergers 
and bank failures both trailed off in 1994, when interstate mergers accelerated. Both sorts of 
mergers make banks larger, of course, but interstate mergers tend to make them wider as well.2 
The number of U.S. commercial banks has sharply declined since the mid 1980's from 14 496 
banks in 1984 to 7 088 banks in 20083, and the assets of the average bank more than tripled from 
$372 million in 1984 to 2 billion in 2008. This increase in bank size and the potential returns to 
                                                          
2
 Our aim in this paper is not to study mergers. Mergers refer to how banks get bigger or wider. We are interested in 
what happens (to risk and returns) as banks grow. 
3
 Data are available from the website of the FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking (HSOB): 
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp. 
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scale is one of the most studied aspects of bank consolidation.4 Until recently, researchers agreed 
that bank returns are a hump-shaped function of assets and that economies of scale turn into 
diseconomies before assets reach the multi-billion dollar range. Peristiani (1997) estimates the 
profit-maximizing level of assets (efficient scale) to be between $300 million to $900 million. 
According to these figures the average bank may now be operating above efficient scale. 
McAllister and McManus (1993) and Wheelock and Wilson (2001) find that banks face 
increasing returns to scale up to at least $500 million of total assets. More recent papers, 
however, (Feng and Serletis, 2009; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012) find contrasting results. For 
instance, Wheelock and Wilson (2012) show that most banking organizations, including the 
largest holding companies, operated under increasing returns to scale over the 1984-2006 period. 
With their focus on scale, researchers have largely ignored the potential geographic 
diversification benefits of consolidation in the banking industry.5 This disinterest may be partly 
theory based; investors can hold shares in banks all over the country, so they may not need banks 
to diversify themselves. Shareholders may even penalize diversification at the firm level if it 
reduces pressures on managers to perform well. The diversification “discount” for non-financial 
firms (where the whole firm is worth less than its parts) suggests that investors prefer focused 
firms with managers that stick to their core business. Laeven and Levine (2007) find a similar 
diversification discount in the case of the banking industry, indicating that economies of scope 
are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium and to outweigh the costs 
associated to agency problems. Diversification is however a core business in banking and 
                                                          
4
 See Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) for an overview of the causes and consequences of consolidation. There 
is also an extensive literature on mergers and potential scale benefits. Rhoades (1994) counted 39 bank merger-
efficiency studies between 1980 and 1993 in the U.S. and DeYoung et al. (2009) review 150 studies conducted 
worldwide after 2000 on bank mergers more generally. In the efficiency studies reviewed by Rhoades, mergers 
rarely lead to lower average costs, even when the merger is between banks with overlapping markets, where the 
potential cost savings are the largest. The early studies tend to focus on the potential cost benefits, in part because 
bank consultants and managers emphasize costs savings. Roughly half of the studies look at market prices, testing 
whether the price of the merging banks' stock increases near the merger. The other half look directly at the bank's 
performance, to see if cost performance actually improves following the mergers. Despite the differences in 
methodology, the results from both types of studies have mostly pointed negative effects; on average, the combined 
stock prices of the merger banks do not increase following mergers, nor does the cost performance of the merging 
banks improve. Performance fails to improve even when there is large degree of market overlap, or a large efficiency 
gap between the acquiring bank and its target. A small number of case studies of mergers suggest reasons why costs 
may not improve. 
5
 Dietsch and Oung (2001) draw a similar conclusion from their study of bank mergers in France: "… market-driven 
merger strategies based on cost synergies do not seem to be empirically justified.  On the other hand, there seems to 
be an underused potential for income synergies and risk diversification gains."  
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therefore it seems plausible to expect some upside for banks that are better diversified. 
Diversification at the bank level may also improve banks’ investment decisions if diversification 
smoothes internal cash flows (via internal capital markets) and helps banks avoid external 
funding (Houston, James, and Marcus 1997).  
While geographic diversification may provide some benefits, spreading across markets is 
not costless, of course. When opening branches in a new county or a new state, banks face 
learning costs due to the lack of information on this new market. These costs can be particularly 
high for banks which specialize in relationship lending such as community banks. As banks 
geographically expand and therefore become larger, collecting soft information becomes more 
costly as the distance between the lender and the borrower increases and the transmission of this 
information across the different management layers becomes more difficult. Moreover, getting 
wider puts distance between principals (executives and owners) and agents (management) and 
hence wider banks may face higher agency costs. Costs associated to geographic diversification 
could hence be different for banks with different business models. As discussed in Stein (2002), 
lending technologies based on soft information will face decreasing returns to scale but lending 
technologies relying on hard information can be more easily scaled up. 6 
Though neglected, researchers have not ignored geographic diversification entirely. In 
their study of listed BHCs, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find that the largest BHCs were more 
diversified across census regions, and that such diversification was associated with lower stock 
return volatility. Assessing the effects of geographic expansion on bank efficiency with a sample 
of 7000 banks from 1993 to 1998, Berger and DeYoung (2001) find contrasting results. On the 
one hand, expansion to nearby states or regions tends to positively affect bank efficiency. But, on 
the other hand, they find that inefficiencies tend to increase with the distance between a bank 
holding company’s headquarters and its subsidiaries, presumably because the managers at a 
faraway subsidiary have more leeway for mismanagement or shirking. Benefits of geographic 
expansion are therefore lower when banks move further away, and this effect is stronger for 
small banks (less than $100 million in assets). The negative impact of distance is also reported by 
Deng and Elyasiani (2008) in terms of higher diversification discount and higher risk. Using a 
                                                          
6
 Loutskina and Strahan (2011) highlight changes in the lending behavior of concentrated lenders (banks which 
operate in one or a few local markets and invest in private information).When they expand beyond their core market, 
concentrated lenders behave more like diversified lenders (banks which operate in many markets and use public 
information) in their newly attained markets.   
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sample of 500 BHC listed banks, the authors analyze the link between geographic diversification 
and BHC value and risk by focusing on the distance between headquarters and branches. While 
increased geographic diversification enhances bank value and reduces risk, larger distance 
generates a diversification discount and higher risk. Hence, the diseconomies associated with 
distance may limit the gains from geographic diversification. Goetz et al. (2013) also find a 
negative relationship between geographic diversity, following interstate bank deregulation, and 
BHC value. According to the authors, this result could reflect agency costs; larger diversity 
makes it more difficult for outside investors to control insiders which allows them to extract 
larger private benefits from the bank. Nevertheless, by further exploring the potential benefits of 
technological progress in the banking industry, Berger and DeYoung (2006) highlight how these 
changes have facilitated the geographic expansion of U.S. banks by reducing distance-related 
agency costs and by improving the control of parent banks on their subsidiaries. Benefits of 
geographic diversification could also result from higher competition in local banking markets. As 
highlighted by Evanoff and Ors (2008), geographic deregulation in the U.S. had a positive effect 
on bank efficiency. By increasing competition on local markets, entry of new competitors, 
through mergers and acquisitions, leads incumbent banks, not involved in the process, to reduce 
their costs and hence improve their cost efficiency. Moreover, bank diversification could also 
impact the risk-taking behavior of local non-diversified competitors. Indeed, Goetz (2012) 
highlight that bank diversification tends to increase bank risk-taking but lowers competitors' risk-
taking.    
These papers do not explore the potential benefits of entering new markets with non-
synchronized fluctuations in economic conditions. When banks are geographically focused, they 
are much more exposed to changes in local economic conditions even when they hold a more 
diversified loan portfolio across a larger number of local customers. However, although portfolio 
theory would predict that geographically concentrated banks would be riskier than 
geographically diversified banks, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence on the vulnerability of 
U.S. banks' to local economic shocks. Meyer and Yeager (2001) do not find a significant link 
between bank performance and local economic conditions. Moreover, focusing on community 
banks located in a single county, Yeager (2004) does not find local economic shocks (which are 
independent from state or nationwide economic conditions) to systematically impair bank 
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performance. If banks are not actually affected by local economic shocks, the potential benefits 
of geographic diversification, particularly for community banks may be questioned. Using a 
technique of simulating mergers, Emmons et al. (2004) investigate the ability of small 
community banks (i.e. with a total assets less than $400 million USD) to reduce default risk 
through scale effects and geographic diversification. The authors conclude that benefits of 
geographic diversification for small community banks are small. As idiosyncratic risk dominates 
local market risk in small community banks, they could reduce failure risk through increasing 
size, by acquiring other banks in the same market they operate. However, for small community 
banks located in urban markets, benefits of geographic diversification are greater, reflecting 
higher heterogeneity in economic conditions across U.S. urban areas than rural areas.  
The 2008 global financial crisis has renewed the debate on the potential dark side of 
geographic diversification through spillover effects of local economic shocks by multi-market 
banks. As pointed out by Morgan et al. (2004), the extent to which geographic expansion reduces 
or increases the exposure to state-level economic volatility depends on whether loan demand 
shocks versus loan supply shocks predominate on the local market. When large loan losses occur 
on a local market, the presence of multi-market banks will reduce the sensitivity of the local 
market to such shocks. Multi-market banks could indeed maintain lending either because they 
have greater access to capital markets than single-market banks or because they can shift funds 
from their other markets. On the other hand, in the presence of demand-side shocks, such as a 
reduction in local borrowers’ creditworthiness or a reduction in local loan demand, the behavior 
of multi-market banks will tend to amplify local shocks. As the perceived profitability of local 
lending decreases, multi-market banks will shift funds to the other markets where they operate. 
Evidence of a positive effect of geographic expansion are found by Strahan (2003), Becker 
(2007) and Keeton (2009), supporting the view that the shift to multi-market banking has reduced 
the overall sensitivity of bank lending to local economic shocks. However, investigating the 
effects of the housing market collapse in 2007-2008, Berrospides et al. (2013) find evidence of 
spillover effects of local economic shocks by multi-market banks.  
  Our aim is to investigate whether greater geographic diversification has been associated 
with higher risk-adjusted returns and to what extent banks’ choices have impacted their default 
risk. As geographic diversification and size are different but interrelated dimensions, we 
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investigate whether the benefits of getting wider differ across bank size. We expect a positive 
relationship between diversification and risk-adjusted returns, but the relationship at one or the 
other extreme (the initial step away from mono-market banking or the giant step towards 
nationwide banking) is undetermined. Moreover, spreading across counties and across states is 
motivated by developing banking activities in locations with different economic environments 
and non-synchronized fluctuations in economic conditions. Disparities in local economic 
conditions should be beneficial and therefore taken into account when assessing the effect of 
geographic diversification on banks' risk-adjusted returns. We expect risk-adjusted return to be 
improved by intrastate geographic diversification when economic disparities within the state 
increase. Consequently, bank default risk might be lower if banks do not switch towards riskier 
strategies. We also expect the same effect for interstate diversification when economic disparities 
across states are higher. However, at its first stages, bank diversification is more likely to occur 
in adjacent counties/states with similar patterns of returns (Emmons et al. (2004)). Consequently, 
the risk-return tradeoff might not be improved at the first stages of geographic diversification and 
the full benefits might only occur when banks reach more distant markets with less correlated 
economic conditions. Conversely, as argued above and supported by recent literature, the agency 
and learning costs induced by distance could also limit the potential benefits of moving to distant 
markets.  
 
3. Data  
3.1 Data and sample  
Data are obtained from two main sources: Call Reports and FDIC’s Summary of Deposits 
(SOD). The measures of geographic diversification used in this paper are based on bank 
branches' deposit dispersion as in Deng and Elyasiani (2008), Goetz et al. (2013) and Goetz 
(2012). 
The initial sample of banks covers the 1994-2008 period. It's an unbalanced panel of 
10681 banks with a total of 92550 annual observations. We measure all variables at the holding-
company level, i.e. we treat all the commercial banks affiliated with a holding company as a 
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single entity. 7  Measuring the variables at the individual bank level would ignore the 
diversification provided via affiliation with banks in other locations. We exclude credit card 
banks, wholesale banks, or other special purpose entities. Diversification may matter for such 
institutions, but because they do not operate deposit networks, deposit data are not a good proxy 
of geographic diversification.8 We exclude BHCs that have not filed Call Reports for at least five 
years. To take bank mergers and acquisitions into consideration, we identify banks whose total 
assets have grown by more than 30% between any two consecutive years (t-1 and t) 9  and 
construct a dummy variable which is equal to 1 in year t and the two following years (that we 
consider as a transitory period) and equal to 0 elsewhere. We conduct all our estimations 
excluding these three-year windows because we use the time dimension to compute some of our 
risk measures (rolling-window standard deviations).  
 
3.2 Diversification measures and their trends 
Geographic diversification for bank10 i in year t, GEODIVit,equals:  
 
GEODIVit = 1 - j (Depositsj /Total deposits)2 
  
Where Depositsj measures the deposits of bank i in location j at time and Total deposits, the total 
deposits of bank i at time t. 
 The GEODIV indexes vary between 0—a BHC with all its deposits in branches in the same 
location—to one—a bank with its deposits spread widely across branches in (infinitely) many 
locations. The branch level data on deposits are from the annual Summary of Deposits collected 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Note that we are using deposits as a proxy for 
                                                          
7
 We aggregate data for commercial banks that are affiliated with the same holding company into BHC-level 
measures for each “market”. For commercial banks that are the holding company (i.e., the only commercial bank 
affiliate), the BHC and bank data are the same.  
8
 To identify wholesale banks, we use information reported for the purposes of the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) that identifies whether an institution is considered a wholesale bank in the context of CRA assessments. The 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and CRA data are calendar year data. Here we also use year-end BHC 
data. Since the Summary of Deposits (SOD) data are reported for June of each year, we merger adjust these data to 
reflect the year-end bank and BHC-affiliates status before constructing our geographic diversification indices.   
9
 To identify banks involved in mergers, we follow a criterion similar to that of Stiroh and Rumble (2006). They 
exclude from their sample observations for banks that have experienced a growth in total assets higher than 20% 
between two consecutive periods.  
10
 Unless otherwise noted, in the rest of the paper, we use interchangeably the words bank and BHC. 
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lending; deposits are not a perfect proxy for loans. Unfortunately U.S. banks do not report 
comprehensive information on where they lend.11    
We measure geographic diversification at two different levels of detail on location. The 
first and finest measure, GD1 counts individual Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSAs) and all 
non-MSA counties as 2600 separate entities. This measure corresponds to the “local market” 
concept used in antitrust analysis and the literature on market structure and performance. The 
second measure, GD2, counts states as separate entities, with MSA and non-MSA counties 
within each state lumped together. In comparison with previous studies on geographic 
diversification, which either focus on the diversification behavior of listed banks (Deng and 
Elyasiani (2008) and Goetz et al. (2013) or on the effect of intrastate diversification on (small) 
banks located in one state (Goetz (2012)), our aim is to provide a broad picture of bank 
geographic diversification and to investigate the effect of both intrastate and interstate 
diversification of U.S. banks. Comparing the relationship between each measure and risk and 
returns will reveal whether the gains from diversification come from spreading across states, or 
whether there are also gains from spreading within states as well.    
Table 1.1 highlights a strong heterogeneity of geographic diversification behavior across 
time.  
Insert Table 1.1 
 
The average U.S. bank has become wider since 1994 (Figure 1). The mean of GD1, the 
geographic diversification index over individual MSAs and rural counties, increased from 0.104 
in 1994 to 0.208 in 2008, an increase of 100 percent. The broader measure of diversification GD2 
also increased very sharply (117.3 percent) indicating stronger interstate expansion during the 
period. In 2008, more than 50 percent of the banking institutions in our sample still operate in a 
single county and more than 75 percent in a single state. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
                                                          
11
 Banks do report application-level data on home mortgage applications, but many home mortgages are sold in the 
secondary mortgage market instead of being held in the originating bank’s portfolio. Banks also report census tract-
level data on small loans originated to businesses and farms. However, small banks are not required to report these 
data. 
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A look at the whole sample of banks over the 1994-2008 period shows that on average, 
more than half of the banks conduct their activities in a single county and more than 90% are 
located in a single state.  
 To disentangle the effect of geographic diversification and size within relatively 
homogenous bank subsets, we assess the effect of geographic diversification on the risk-return 
tradeoff using three sub-samples of banks. We consider three types of banks: small banks, large 
banks and very large banks. Following the literature, small banks are those with total assets 
below or equal to $1 billion. Most of them are community banks, roughly defined in the literature 
as institutions with total assets below $1 billion and that are essentially focused on relationship 
lending (see DeYoung et al., 2004 for a survey on this question).12 During the second part of the 
1990s, a broad process of consolidation occurred in the U.S. banking industry during which most 
mergers involved two community banks or had a community bank as a target (DeYoung and 
Hunter, 2003). Despite this process which lead both to an increase in average bank size13 and to a 
reduction in community banks' market share, community banks still play an important role in 
relationship lending to small businesses. We consider two subsets for large banks. After the 2008 
financial crisis the Federal Reserve has distinguished very large and systemically important 
institutions from other large banks with a threshold of $50 billion (FED, 2011). We hence 
consider a sub-sample of large banks (total assets above $1 billion and below $50 billion) and a 
sub-sample of very large banks (total assets of $50 billion and above). In line with the literature 
on the scale benefits of consolidation which highlights rapid diseconomies before assets reach the 
multi-billion dollar range, we expect the benefits of intrastate and interstate geographic 
diversification to be different at one or the other extreme in terms of bank size. 
  
                                                          
12
 As pointed out in DeYoung et al. (2004), bank size is not the only criterion to take into account to characterize an 
institution as a community bank; geographic concentration (single county for the smallest or single state for the 
largest), range of services and ownership structure (independent and domestically-owned) have also been taken into 
account to define a financial institution as a community bank. 
13
 The number of U.S. banks with assets below $1 billion declined from 14078 in 1980 to 7631 in 2001 and their 
market share fell from 33.4% to 16%.  
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 3.3 Bank profitability and risk measures 
To measure bank profitability, we use the return on assets (ROAit) and the return on 
equity (ROEit):                                                                    
 
 To measure bank risk-taking we use the standard deviation of the return on assets, 
(SdROAit) and the standard deviation of the return on equity, (SdROEit) computed on a rolling 
window of 3 years.14  
To measure risk-adjusted return we compute the ratio of ROAit to its standard deviation 
SdROAit, RaROAit and the ratio of ROEit to its standard deviation SdROEit, RaROEit:  
 
RaROAit ROAitSdROAit 
RaRO it RO itSdRO it 
 
We also consider a measure of bank default risk by computing a 3-year rolling Z-score defined 
as:                                                  
 
where EQUITY is the ratio of Total equity to Total assets;            and                  are backward 
moving averages of ROA and EQUITY on a 3-year rolling window. The Z-score indicates the 
number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROA has to fall below its expected value before 
equity is depleted. Thus, a higher value of Z is associated with a lower default probability.  
                                                          
14The rolling windows cover for year t, year t and the previous two years.   
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 In our regressions, we exclude observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentile of 
our bank profitability, risk-adjusted returns and bank risk measures to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. We hence end up with a panel of 6532 banks and a total of 74054 observations. 
 
3.4 Indicators of disparities in economic conditions within/across states  
 To assess whether banks actually benefit from disparities in economic conditions when they 
spread their activities in new markets across counties and states, we construct indicators of 
economic disparities within and across states.  
To compute these indicators, we use annual information on county-level and state-level 
unemployment rates. A higher dispersion in the unemployment rate within the state or across 
states measured at a given date is used as a proxy of higher economic disparities within the 
state/across states. Our measure of 'within-state' economic disparities, SdUnempStst, is the 
dispersion of unemployment rates across the counties of a given state s at time t. Similarly, our 
measure of 'across-states' economic disparities, SdUnempCtryt, is the dispersion of 
unemployment rates across U.S. states at time t. The measure of dispersion we use is the standard 
deviation of the unemployment rate at a given date. 
Interacting these indicators with the diversification variables (GD1it*SdUnempStst and 
GD2it*SdUnempCtryt) aims to capture the impact of larger disparities in economic conditions 
within and across states on the benefits of geographic diversification. We expect the benefits of 
geographic diversification to be higher in the presence of larger disparities. Because we do not 
know the composition of the bank’s loan portfolio and hence the geographic location of its 
customers, our state-level indicator is matched with our bank-level geographic diversification 
measures according to the location of the bank’ headquarter. 
 
3.5 Other explanatory and control variables 
Other bank-specific variables are included as control variables (CONTROLit), to account 
for differences in portfolio diversification and functional diversification. Two product 
diversification indexes (LOANit and FOREIGNit) and one functional diversification index 
(INCOMEit) are computed. Diversification indexes across the major loan categories (LOANit), 
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across foreign and domestic loans (FOREIGNit), and across interest and non-interest income 
sources (INCOMEit) for each bank, i, in each year, t, are measured analogously: 
 
LOANit = 1 - jj=1-6 (Loansj /Total loans)2 
 
FOREIGNit = 1 – (Foreign loans/Total loans)2 + (Domestic loans/Total loans)2 
 
INCOMEit =   1 – (Non-interest income/Income)2 + (Interest income/Income)2 
 
Loan diversification (LOANit) is measured across the six major loan categories (Loansj) 
reported in the Call Reports: commercial and industrial, commercial real estate, home mortgages, 
consumer, agricultural, and other. The non-interest activities measured by INCOMEit include any 
fee-generating activities by banks (as opposed to interest), e.g. underwriting, payment services, 
trading activities.... Radecki (1999) documents the sizable shift toward such activities, especially 
by larger banks. Stiroh (2004a and b), Stiroh (2006) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) report that a 
higher share of non-interest income in total income positively affects the volatility of bank 
returns inducing higher risk. In principle, foreign diversification (FOREIGNit) should operate on 
risk and return in the same way as domestic diversification across the U.S.. We also include 
liquidity risk LIQUID_RISKit, (Core deposits/Total assets), leverage, EQUITYit, (Total 
equity/Total assets) and Credit risk, CRED_RISKit, (Net charges off of loans and leases/Total 
loans)15 in the estimations.  
Dummy variables are also included to identify the main bank loan specialization 
(agricultural loan, mortgage specialists, consumer-oriented…) and to distinguish some specific 
types of banks (banks which are part of a holding company from independent banks and 
agricultural lending institutions). We also take into account the specific characteristics of our 
sample regarding geographic diversification/concentration. Because more than half of the banks 
in our sample operate in a single county and more than 90% are located in a single state, we 
include in our estimations two dummy variables which take the value of 1 if the bank is located 
in a single county or a single state respectively. Apart from time effects, we also include a 
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 We also run regressions from which CRED_RISKit is excluded from the set of explanatory variables.   
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dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in 2007 and 2008 and 0 before to account for the 
specific effect of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Finally, while these time effects are 
constant across banks but could differ across states, we also add the growth rate of the real gross 
domestic product of state s at time t (GROWTHst) and the standard deviation of the 
unemployment rate within the state where the bank’s headquarter is located (SdUnempStst) to 
account for differences in economic conditions across U.S. states. 
Tables 1.2 to 1.5 provide descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for our three sub-
samples (small banks, large banks and very large banks).  
 
Insert Tables 1.2 to 1.5  
 
The descriptive statistics highlight a strong heterogeneity across banks in terms of 
geographic expansion. More than 50% of small banks are located in a single county and more 
than 90% operate in a single state only. Conversely, very large banks are all located in more than 
one state. In between, more than half of large banks are present in more than one state. 
The correlation matrices among our major variables highlight a positive correlation 
between geographic diversification and size as one would expect (Tables 2.1 and 2.2).  
  
Insert Tables 2.1 and 2.2  
  
To deal with co-linearity issues, we orthogonalize the logarithm of total assets, with each of our 
two geographic diversification indexes and use the residuals as our bank size proxy (SIZE). 16  
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 For example, when considering geographic diversification across rural and MSA counties, GD1, we regress the 
logarithm of total assets on GD1 and use the residuals as a proxy of size. 
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4. Econometric methodology and results 
 
4.1 Econometric methodology 
Our baseline model is as follows:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
 Yit is either a measure of profitability, risk-adjusted return, risk-taking or default risk of 
bank i at time t, GEODIVit is one of the two indicators of geographic diversification of bank i at 
time t (GD1it or GD2it) and SIZE it is an indicator of bank size of bank i at time t. We use our 
bank size measure from which the impact of geographic diversification has been pulled out. Each 
geographic diversification index is separately included as well as its squared value; we also 
interact the geographic diversification index and its squared value with its corresponding (state-
level or nationwide) measure of disparities in economic conditions, SDUNEMPt (SdUnempStst or 
SdUnempCtryt). These interaction terms capture the influence of within/across states disparities 
in economic conditions on the benefits of geographic diversification. The intrastate geographic 
diversification index (GD1it) is interacted with SdUnempStst, our state-level indicator of 
economic dispersion which measures the dispersion of unemployment rates across the counties 
of a given state, s, at time t. The interstate geographic diversification index (GD2it) is interacted 
with SdUnempCtryt, our country-level indicator of economic dispersion, which measures the 
dispersion of unemployment rates across U.S. states at time t. αi and αT are respectively the 
individual effects  and time-specific effects.  
 Our baseline model accounts for possible U or humped shaped relationships between 
geographic diversification and the dependent variable (either profitability, risk-adjusted return, 
risk-taking or default risk) at different levels of size and economic conditions. As argued above, 
while spreading across new markets should be beneficial in terms of risk-adjusted return 
(portfolio diversification gains), it could also have some negative effects due to larger distance 
from headquarters (information costs and agency costs). Moreover, differences in size and 
business model could also impact geographic diversification benefits. Lending technologies 
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which rely on soft information are less extendable than those based on hard information. Hence, 
when expanding beyond their core market, small banks and more specifically community banks 
specialized in relationship lending may face higher costs than larger banks which rely on 
transaction-based lending technologies.  
 In order to assess whether the benefits of geographic diversification outweigh its costs, we 
estimate the marginal effect of geographic diversification i.e. the first derivative of Yit with 
respect to the geographic diversification index (GEODIVit): 
                                                                                                                                          (2) 
 
    The value of the marginal effect of geographic diversification on Yit is computed using the 
average value of the geographic diversification indicator (                 ) and of the disparities of 
economic conditions (                     ). 
 
 When significant non-linear effects are captured by our estimations, we further estimate the 
inflection point, GEODIV*, by taking the first derivative of Yit with respect to the geographic 
diversification index (GEODIVit) defined in equation (2) and equalizing it to zero:  
                                                                                                                                                                 (3) 
 
We run the regressions using a fixed effects model and regression errors are clustered at 
the bank level. We first estimate a model including only the geographic diversification indicator 
and its squared-value and include in a second step the interaction terms between the geographic 
diversification index and our indicators of economic disparities. In each step, we conduct 
estimations on the whole sample and on our three different sub-samples (small banks, large 
banks and very large banks).  
The estimation results are reported in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6.17 
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 These tables report results with ROA and SdROA as the profitability and bank risk taking measures respectively. 
Considering ROE and SdROE provides similar findings. Results are available from the authors on request.  
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4.2 Geographic diversification and size 
 Considering the whole sample of banks (Table 3), we first highlight a hump-shaped 
relationship between geographic diversification and risk-adjusted returns. Whatever its scope, 
geographic diversification improves the risk-return tradeoff of U.S. banks over the period under 
study.  
At first stages of diversification, spreading across counties (GD1) or across states (GD2) 
allows banks to improve their risk-return tradeoff; however, when geographic diversification 
goes further up, this positive effect turns out to be negative. Spreading across rural and MSA 
counties (GD1) reduces banks’ earnings volatility measured by the standard deviation of the 
return on assets, although only at the 10 percent significance level. As argued above, non-
linearity in the impact of geographic diversification could be explained by higher costs (agency 
costs and learning costs) faced by banks as they become more geographically-diversified. 
Whereas geographic expansion might improve the risk/return tradeoff at the first stages of 
diversification, spreading across more and more different markets make it more difficult for 
principals (executive managers located at the headquarter and owners of the bank) to monitor 
agents (managers of branches located in other counties or other states). Learning costs are also 
higher because of the lack of information when entering in a new market (Berger and DeYoung, 
2001). The marginal effect of geographic diversification on profitability and risk-adjusted return 
is positive and significant for both intrastate and interstate diversification.18 Whatever its scope, 
geographic diversification is beneficial for U.S. banks over the period and, on average, U.S. 
banks are below the level of diversification for which the benefits are counterbalanced by the 
costs.19  
We then question whether the average (non-linear) benefits of geographic diversification 
on risk-adjusted return are impacted by differences in bank size (Table 4). We find intrastate and 
interstate geographic diversification to have a different effect on risk-adjusted return and bank 
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 For this specification of our baseline model including only the geographic diversification indicator and its squared 
value, the marginal effect and the inflection point are defined as follows: 
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 For intrastate diversification, in our estimations, the costs are found to counterbalance the benefits when the level 
of diversification reaches a value of 0.45 (compared to an average level of intrastate geographic diversification of 
0.14 over the whole sample) and for interstate diversification the inflection point is equal to 0.27 (compared to an 
average level of interstate diversification of 0.01 over the whole sample).  
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risk according to bank size. Firstly, we find a hump-shaped relationship between intrastate 
diversification and both profitability and risk-adjusted return for small banks which further 
benefit from lower return's volatility, but this effect is only significant at the 10 percent level. At 
the other extreme, for very large banks (i.e. with total assets above $50 billion) we find both 
intrastate and interstate diversification to improve the risk-return tradeoff.20 We still find a hump-
shaped relationship between both intrastate and interstate expansion and risk-adjusted return. 
Finally, we do not find any significant effect for large banks (those with total assets ranging from 
$1 billion to $50 billion). While the marginal effect of intrastate diversification is positive and 
significant for small banks, this effect is not significant for very large banks. This result indicates 
that whilst intrastate expansion is still beneficial for the average small bank in our sample, the 
average very large bank has reached a level of geographic diversification such as the benefits of 
both intrastate and interstate diversification are now counterbalanced by their costs. With an 
average level of intrastate diversification of 0.13, small banks are well below the optimal level of 
diversification estimated at 0.48 and could benefit from further intrastate diversification. On the 
contrary, for the sub-sample of very large banks, which already show a high level of intrastate 
and interstate diversification (respectively 0.78 and 0.64), further expansion would not improve 
their risk/return tradeoff, with an estimated inflection point for intrastate diversification of 0.70 
and of 0.62 for interstate diversification. Such differences in the optimal level of diversification 
across bank size could be explained by differences in banks’ business model. For small banks 
specialized in relationship lending, the optimal level of geographic diversification may be smaller 
than for large banks specialized in transaction-based lending.   
Our results clearly highlight non-linearity in the impact of geographic diversification. 
Whereas at one extreme, intrastate geographic expansion positively impacts small banks’ risk-
adjusted return and reduces their risk, at the other extreme, very large banks fully benefit from 
both intrastate and interstate diversification. But, in between, geographic diversification does not 
appear to be beneficial. Such limits in the benefits of geographic diversification for larger banks 
are consistent with the findings of Deng and Elyasiani (2008) who highlight a reduction in BHC 
value and an increase in bank risk with higher distance between headquarter and branches. 
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 The effect is significant when using RaROE as a measure of risk-adjusted return. 
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Similar conclusions are highlighted by Goetz et al. (2013) who show that higher geographic 
diversification due to interstate deregulation is associated with a reduction in BHC value.  
 Regarding control variables, income diversification across interest and non-interest 
activities improves profitability, increases bank risk (volatility of returns and default risk) and 
reduces risk-adjusted returns. These results are in line with those obtained for U.S. banks by 
Stiroh (2006) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006). Moreover, higher diversification across different 
loan activities reduces bank profitability. As expected, foreign diversification reduces the 
volatility of returns and default risk. However, it does not impact risk-adjusted returns.  
 
4. 3 Geographic diversification and disparities in economic conditions within and across 
states  
We now focus on the influence of disparities in economic conditions on the actual 
geographic diversification benefits by looking at the coefficients of the geographic diversification 
indexes interacted with the corresponding disparity indicator.   
Considering first the whole sample of banks, the benefits of geographic diversification (in 
terms of risk-adjusted return) across rural and MSA counties (GD1) are reduced, although only at 
the 10 percent level, when disparities in economic conditions within states increase 
(GD*SdUNEMP negative and significant) (Table 5). However, as the level of diversification 
increases, we highlight a reversed effect (GD2*SdUNEMP positive and significant). For 
intrastate diversification, in the presence of higher disparities, returns on assets do not as highly 
benefit from diversification and such a result holds for either initially low or high levels of 
diversification (GD2*SdUNEMP not significant). The marginal effect of intrastate expansion on 
risk-adjusted return is positive and significant. However, when comparing this value for both 
specifications of our baseline model (i.e. including or not the effect of disparities of economic 
conditions), the effect is smaller when taking into account the influence of economic disparities.  
We take our investigation further by assessing potential differences across bank size 
(Table 6). For small banks, higher disparities in economic conditions within states (between 
counties) or between states does not impact the relationship between geographic diversification 
and risk-adjusted returns. For very large banks, whatever their scope, the benefits of geographic 
diversification are impacted by disparities in economic conditions and these effects are non-
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linear. In the presence of larger disparities, the negative effect of expansion across states on risk 
(earnings volatility) is reduced (GD*SdUNEMP is positive and significant).  But as the level of 
interstate diversification increases, this effect tends to be lower (GD2*SdUNEMP is significant), 
allowing banks to benefit from increased disparities in economic conditions across states. Risk-
adjusted return is negatively affected for very large banks. But, as they get more diversified 
which could mean that they are moving further away, risk-adjusted return is improved. However, 
the marginal effect is not significant.  
According to our results, the relationship between geographic diversification and banks’ 
risk-adjusted return and risk are non-linear and these relationships are impacted by the existence 
of economic disparities across counties or states where banks are located. Whereas entering in 
new markets (new counties or new states) improves a bank’s risk/return tradeoff, this effect could 
have been weaker when the first steps of geographic diversification occurred across counties or 
across states with correlated economic conditions. This result is consistent with the U.S banking 
industry consolidation process which occurred during the second part of the 1990s. As pointed 
out by DeYoung and Hunter (2003), Berger et al. (2004) and Emmons et al., (2004), the bulk of 
mergers are “mini-mergers” which involved small/community banks, in most cases located 
nearby. Such an expansion allows banks to reduce their idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, as these 
new markets are nearby their own local market, banks do not face sharp increases in monitoring 
and learning costs. However, if these markets are very close, we can expect ups and downs in 
economic activity to be strongly correlated.21 The benefits of geographic diversification will then 
be incomplete. When banks expand in more distant new markets, agency and learning costs 
increase but the benefits of expanding in non-contiguous markets with non-synchronized 
economic conditions are higher. This might be the outcome of greater heterogeneity of economic 
conditions across U.S. urban areas than rural areas in line with the findings of Emmons et al. 
(2004) who find greater benefits of geographic diversification for urban community banks than 
for rural banks.   
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 Berger and DeYoung (2001) highlight the strong potential benefits of geographic diversification from cross-
regional consolidation indicating that banks have incentives to expand beyond contiguous markets into non-
contiguous markets to capture additional diversification gains. 
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4.4 Robustness checks22  
 Whilst we control for the effect of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 by introducing a 
dummy variable, we also conduct our estimation over the 1994-2006 period, excluding the years 
2007 and 2008. On the whole, our main findings are unaffected.  
 We also consider an alternative measure of intrastate diversification that counts the 
individual MSAs separately, but treats all non-MSA counties as a single entity, giving us 380 
entities in total. Economic fluctuations may indeed be similar in adjacent rural counties and 
therefore spreading that way may not yield much diversification. While we do not find any 
significant effect for small banks, very large banks benefit from diversification across MSA 
counties. 
 We also define other size groups for our different subsamples of banks. We isolate a group 
of very small banks (with total assets below $500 million) and a group of medium sized banks 
(with total assets between $1 billion and $10 billion). Again, our main findings remain the same.   
 As discussed in Goetz (2012), the decision to expand activities across counties or across 
states might not be strictly exogenous and therefore correlated with past and possibly current 
realizations of the errors term in equation (1). To deal with endogeneity issues, we estimate 
equation (1) using the instrumental variables method (IV). To instrument our geographic 
diversification measure (GD1 and GD2) and their squared value, we use the lagged values of 
both our geographic diversification measures and their squared values. We also use indicators 
which enable us to account for differences across U.S. states in intrastate and interstate branching 
restrictions. For our intrastate diversification indicator (GD1) we include the number of elapsed 
years since a state first started to remove its intrastate branching restrictions (Goetz (2012)). For 
our interstate diversification measure, we use the index of interstate branching restrictions 
computed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Indeed, the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act contained provisions which granted states the right to erect roadblocks to branch expansion. 
These differences in regulatory barriers across states could have affected bank competition and 
bank geographic diversification behaviors. Using this set of instruments, the results are similar to 
those obtained with the OLS estimator.   
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 The results of these estimations are not reported but are available from the authors on request. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 This paper contributes to the literature on bank diversification by focusing on the benefits of 
geographic diversification. Since 1994, U.S. banks have strongly expanded their activities across 
counties and across states. Our findings clearly highlight some benefits from being present in 
more counties within the same state as well as across states. We use detailed data covering the 
1994-2008 period and consider bank geographic diversification from the extreme case of 
institutions with operations limited to a single location (individual Metropolitan Statistical area 
(MSA) or individual county) to the case where customers are reached nationwide. While (either 
intrastate or interstate) geographic diversification is, on the whole, beneficial in terms of risk-
adjusted return, the effects are non-linear and depend on bank size. While at first stages of 
diversification spreading across counties or across states improves banks’ risk-adjusted return, 
this positive effect turns out to be negative when geographic diversification moves further up. 
For small banks (i.e. with total assets below $1 billion), our results indicate that, on average, they 
still have not reached their optimal diversification level. Further expansion across new counties 
may therefore improve their risk-return tradeoff. At the other extreme, both local (at the MSA or 
county level) and global (nationwide) geographic diversification are beneficial for very large 
banks. However, moving further does not always provide additional benefits. Expanding 
activities towards markets with different economic conditions, as measured by the dispersion in 
unemployment rates, increases the benefits of diversification but not at initially relatively low 
levels of diversification. At initially low levels of diversification, larger differences in economic 
conditions actually alter the benefits of geographic diversification but moving further is 
beneficial. Our results suggest that the agency costs of going far are, at some stage, 
counterbalanced by the pure portfolio benefits of diversification.   
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Graph 1: Intrastate and Interstate geographic diversification of US banks (1994 – 2008)  
 
GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index 
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Table 1.1 Intrastate and Interstate diversification of U.S. banks 
 
1994 - 2008 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.146 0.237 0 0.978 0 0 0 0.275 0.520 0.852 
GD2 0.0149 0.0796 0 0.918 0 0 0 0 0 0.481 
N 74054          
1994  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.104 0.211 0 0.955 0 0 0 0 0.477 0.823 
GD2 0.00923 0.0647 0 0.856 0 0 0 0 0 0.438 
N 5074          
2008 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p99 
GD1 0.208 0.268 0 0.965 0 0 0 0.438 0.627 0.886 
GD2 0.0256 0.103 0 0.906 0 0 0 0 2.22e-16 0.565 
N 4248          
GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states geographic diversification index; N: number of observations; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics - Whole sample (1994 – 2008) 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Bank-level variables 
ROA 0.0114 0.00525 -0.0111 0.0283 0.00531 0.00840 0.0113 0.0143 0.0178 
ROE 0.113 0.0508 -0.0399 0.265 0.0522 0.0802 0.111 0.144 0.180 
SdROA 0.00210 0.00213 0.000129 0.0165 0.000453 0.000803 0.00145 0.00258 0.00443 
SdROE 0.0207 0.0195 0.00175 0.127 0.00462 0.00798 0.0145 0.0262 0.0449 
RaROA 9.942 7.334 0.894 34.62 2.535 4.450 7.789 13.49 20.87 
RaROE 9.562 6.694 1.143 31.16 2.664 4.458 7.693 12.93 19.79 
Z 119.3 125.8 5.320 923.1 24.23 42.69 78.57 145.3 260.0 
GD1 0.146 0.237 0 0.978 0 0 0 0.275 0.520 
GD2 0.0149 0.0796 0 0.918 0 0 0 0 0 
INCOME 0.251 0.0913 0 0.500 0.138 0.186 0.244 0.309 0.374 
FOREIGN 0.000800 0.0161 0 0.500 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.692 0.108 0 1.000 0.551 0.656 0.723 0.764 0.790 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00276 0.00658 -0.195 0.455 -0.000248 0.000217 0.00126 0.00330 0.00715 
EQUITY 0.105 0.0347 -0.0150 0.767 0.0740 0.0830 0.0966 0.118 0.147 
LIQUID_RISK 0.729 0.0952 0.00223 0.979 0.608 0.677 0.743 0.797 0.836 
TA 725581.7 15015442.4 1050 1746720425 21976 40095 82937.5 180606 421911 
log(TA) 11.44 1.273 6.957 21.28 9.998 10.60 11.33 12.10 12.95 
State and country level macroeconomic variables 
SdUnempSt 2.180 1.147 0.100 8.136 0.980 1.367 1.987 2.762 3.619 
SdUnempCtry 1.572 0.292 1.201 2.230 1.276 1.363 1.500 1.718 2.165 
GROWTH 0.0444 0.0596 -0.0483 0.379 0.00146 0.0140 0.0301 0.0511 0.0807 
N = 74054 n = 6532         
ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROA ; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of 
ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states 
geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; 
LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: 
Core deposits/Total assets; TA: Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile.   
SdUnempCtry: Standard deviation of unemployment rates across the states at time t; SdUnempSt: Standard deviation of unemployment rates across the counties of a given 
state s at time t; GROWTH: rate of growth of (real) gross domestic product of a given state s at time t.  
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Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics –Small banks (Total Assets ≤ $1 billion) (1994 – 2008) 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.0113 0.00527 -0.0111 0.0283 0.00527 0.00835 0.0112 0.0143 0.0178 
ROE 0.113 0.0506 -0.0399 0.265 0.0517 0.0795 0.110 0.143 0.179 
SdROA 0.00212 0.00213 0.000129 0.0165 0.000460 0.000812 0.00146 0.00260 0.00446 
SdROE 0.0208 0.0195 0.00175 0.127 0.00462 0.00801 0.0146 0.0263 0.0449 
RaROA 9.852 7.288 0.894 34.62 2.521 4.419 7.710 13.34 20.68 
RaROE 9.475 6.642 1.143 31.16 2.652 4.428 7.629 12.77 19.54 
Z 118.8 125.6 5.320 923.1 24.20 42.54 78.16 144.5 258.6 
GD1 0.130 0.219 0 0.917 0 0 0 0.231 0.495 
GD2 0.00793 0.0535 0 0.686 0 0 0 0 0 
INCOME 0.247 0.0889 0 0.500 0.136 0.184 0.241 0.304 0.366 
FOREIGN 0.000374 0.0116 0 0.500 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.691 0.109 0 1.000 0.548 0.654 0.722 0.763 0.789 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00272 0.00662 -0.195 0.455 -0.000273 0.000195 0.00122 0.00326 0.00714 
EQUITY 0.106 0.0349 -0.0150 0.767 0.0743 0.0833 0.0972 0.119 0.148 
LIQUID_RISK 0.734 0.0912 0.00293 0.979 0.617 0.683 0.746 0.799 0.837 
TA 134304.8 156771.8 1050 998767 21534 38870 78455.5 160841.5 317767 
log(TA) 11.29 1.025 6.957 13.81 9.977 10.57 11.27 11.99 12.67 
N = 71064 n = 6370         
ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of 
ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states 
geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; 
LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: 
Core deposits/Total assets; TA: Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile. 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive statistics – Large banks ($1 Billion <Total assets < $50 Billion) (1994 – 2008) 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.0119 0.00466 -0.0109 0.0276 0.00650 0.00962 0.0121 0.0145 0.0172 
ROE 0.135 0.0496 -0.0395 0.265 0.0735 0.108 0.136 0.167 0.196 
SdROA 0.00177 0.00211 0.000129 0.0165 0.000339 0.000606 0.00111 0.00206 0.00382 
SdROE 0.0196 0.0193 0.00175 0.127 0.00458 0.00736 0.0132 0.0242 0.0426 
RaROA 12.32 8.115 0.895 34.34 3.071 5.854 10.52 17.66 24.87 
RaROE 11.72 7.530 1.146 31.08 3.012 5.698 9.984 16.66 23.30 
Z 133.0 131.1 5.339 921.3 26.13 48.38 91.83 166.6 293.0 
GD1 0.501 0.333 0 0.978 0 0.160 0.579 0.807 0.892 
GD2 0.156 0.218 0 0.861 0 0 2.22e-16 0.286 0.505 
INCOME 0.339 0.0946 0.0287 0.500 0.207 0.277 0.347 0.409 0.458 
FOREIGN 0.00637 0.0396 0 0.496 0 0 0 0 0 
LOAN 0.723 0.0905 0.0234 0.965 0.619 0.696 0.745 0.780 0.799 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00347 0.00558 -0.0159 0.0817 0.000288 0.000999 0.00216 0.00390 0.00700 
EQUITY 0.0908 0.0239 0.0116 0.308 0.0694 0.0779 0.0868 0.0981 0.111 
LIQUID_RISK 0.634 0.121 0.00223 0.895 0.493 0.573 0.648 0.715 0.772 
TA 4919490.5 7264290.2 1000069 49711241 1111408 1359556 2114050 4854243 11780002 
log(TA) 14.85 0.926 13.82 17.72 13.92 14.12 14.56 15.40 16.28 
N = 2833 n = 482         
ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of 
ROE; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states 
geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; 
LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: 
Core deposits/Total assets; TA: Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile.   
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Table 1.5 Descriptive statistics – Very large banks (Total assets ≥ $50 Billion) (1994 – 2008) 
          
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
ROA 0.0123 0.00369 -0.00234 0.0257 0.00851 0.0107 0.0125 0.0145 0.0158 
ROE 0.143 0.0423 -0.0222 0.236 0.0920 0.125 0.148 0.169 0.190 
SdROA 0.00224 0.00214 0.000203 0.0153 0.000528 0.000865 0.00168 0.00270 0.00481 
SdROE 0.0232 0.0184 0.00184 0.0872 0.00470 0.00912 0.0175 0.0307 0.0517 
RaROA 9.774 7.121 0.965 34.52 2.767 4.362 7.381 13.82 20.47 
RaROE 10.48 7.753 1.254 30.95 2.955 4.260 7.515 15.73 21.79 
Z 91.27 88.88 6.531 520.1 20.62 37.02 61.99 124.1 196.6 
GD1 0.780 0.269 0.0173 0.962 0.130 0.787 0.904 0.936 0.953 
GD2 0.643 0.252 0 0.918 0.197 0.587 0.746 0.809 0.856 
INCOME 0.460 0.0376 0.275 0.500 0.407 0.442 0.468 0.490 0.498 
FOREIGN 0.0930 0.156 0 0.500 0 0.00286 0.0195 0.0913 0.439 
LOAN 0.777 0.0558 0.611 0.940 0.688 0.755 0.782 0.812 0.838 
CREDIT_RISK 0.00567 0.00467 0.0000120 0.0316 0.00165 0.00261 0.00430 0.00697 0.0121 
EQUITY 0.0875 0.0183 0.0534 0.163 0.0664 0.0756 0.0854 0.0960 0.108 
LIQUID_RISK 0.504 0.134 0.120 0.866 0.319 0.450 0.536 0.579 0.640 
TA 192681981.5 261717268.8 50073829 1746720425 55392628 66242755 92636000 179362000 472126081 
log(TA) 18.63 0.823 17.73 21.28 17.83 18.01 18.34 19.00 19.97 
N = 157 n = 27         
ROA: Net income/Total assets; ROE: Net income/Total equity; SdROA is the 3-year window standard deviation of ROA; SdROE is the 3-year window standard deviation of 
ROE ; RaROA: ROA/SdROA; RaROE: ROE/SdROE; Z: 3-year rolling Z-score; GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD2: across states 
geographic diversification index; INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; 
LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: 
Core deposits/Total assets; TA: Total assets; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); N: number of observations; n: number of banks; pi: ith percentile.   
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Table 2.1: Correlation matrix (GD1)  
 
 GD1 GD1² Log(TA) SIZE INCOME FOREIGN LOAN CREDIT_RISK EQUITY LIQUID_RISK 
GD1 1          
GD1² 0.951 1         
Log(TA) 0.507 0.529 1        
SIZE 0.12 0.175 0.920 1       
INCOME 0.213 0.217 0.325 0.278 1      
FOREIGN 0.0179 0.0207 0.160 0.177 0.0803 1     
LOAN 0.170 0.164 0.194 0.146 0.261 0.0201 1    
CREDIT_RISK 0.0216 0.0251 0.0144 0.00671 0.0794 0.0249 0.0249 1   
EQUITY -0.170 -0.145 -0.223 -0.180 -0.252 -0.0232 -0.182 -0.0395 1  
LIQUID_RISK -0.122 -0.126 -0.372 -0.372 -0.0768 -0.195 -0.0162 -0.0469 -0.142 1 
GD1: across rural and MSA counties geographic diversification index; GD1²: squared value of GD1; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); SIZE: 
orthogonalized value of log (TA) with GD1 as measure of geographic diversification; INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; 
FOREIGN: diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net charges 
off of loans and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets. 
 
Table 2.2: Correlation matrix (GD2) 
 
 GD2 GD2² Log(TA) SIZE INCOME FOREIGN LOAN CREDIT_RISK EQUITY LIQUID_RISK 
GD2 1          
GD2² 0.947 1         
Log(TA) 0.444 0.422 1        
SIZE 0.275 0.261 0.983 1       
INCOME 0.179 0.169 0.325 0.313 1      
FOREIGN 0.103 0.101 0.160 0.151 0.0803 1     
LOAN 0.0716 0.0680 0.194 0.193 0.261 0.0201 1    
CREDIT_RISK 0.0292 0.0289 0.0144 0.00953 0.0794 0.0249 0.0249 1   
EQUITY -0.0687 -0.0569 -0.223 -0.226 -0.252 -0.0232 -0.182 -0.039 1  
LIQUID_RISK -0.156 -0.145 -0.372 -0.367 -0.0768 -0.195 -0.0162 -0.0469 -0.142 1 
GD2: across state geographic diversification index; GD2²: squared value of GD2; Log(TA): natural logarithm of Total assets (TA); SIZE: orthogonalized 
value of log (TA) with GD2 as measure of geographic diversification; INCOME: diversification index across interest and non-interest income; FOREIGN: 
diversification index across domestic and foreign loans; LOAN: diversification index across major loans categories; CRED_RISK: Net charges off of loans 
and leases/Total loans; EQUITY: Total equity/Total assets; LIQUID_RISK: Core deposits/Total assets.  
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Table 3: Benefits of geographic diversification of U.S. banks (1994 – 2008) 
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV). Explained variables are 
ROA, SdROA, RaROA and RaROE and Z. GD1 measures intrastate diversification and GD2 measures interstate diversification. Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.5. N: 
number of observations; n: number of banks; Marginal effect: when significant non-linear effects are captured by our estimations, the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained 
variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. R2: adjusted R squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00648*** 4.134** 4.211** -0.00111* 19.59 0.00407*** 6.249* 7.432** -0.00164* 64.93 
 (7.26) (1.98) (2.10) (-1.85) (0.63) (2.75) (1.87) (2.28) (-1.93) (1.34) 
GEODIV² -0.00560*** -4.521* -3.663 0.00102 -15.57 -0.00275 -11.45** -13.83** 0.00354** -139.7 
 (-5.08) (-1.71) (-1.40) (1.34) (-0.40) (-1.16) (-1.97) (-2.31) (2.37) (-1.54) 
SIZE 0.00161*** 0.949*** 0.694*** -0.000308*** 7.410* 0.00147*** 0.847*** 0.723*** -0.000304*** 7.579* 
 (11.19) (3.43) (2.72) (-3.14) (1.70) (10.95) (3.25) (2.99) (-3.27) (1.87) 
INCOME 0.00117** -4.836*** -4.920*** 0.00198*** -73.79*** 0.00104** -4.930*** -4.902*** 0.00199*** -74.10*** 
 (2.23) (-5.48) (-5.86) (6.49) (-5.56) (2.00) (-5.60) (-5.87) (6.53) (-5.61) 
FOREIGN -0.00368 -5.985 -1.071 0.00547* -42.83 -0.00332 -7.206 -3.420 0.00608** -64.07 
 (-0.86) (-1.11) (-0.18) (1.96) (-0.82) (-0.79) (-1.24) (-0.54) (2.09) (-1.16) 
LOAN -0.00113** -0.114 0.0161 -0.000140 -4.331 -0.00115** -0.162 -0.0194 -0.000131 -4.654 
 (-2.19) (-0.12) (0.02) (-0.45) (-0.29) (-2.23) (-0.17) (-0.02) (-0.42) (-0.31) 
GROWTH 0.00289*** 2.499** 1.937* -0.00205*** 68.86*** 0.00289*** 2.523** 1.961* -0.00206*** 69.16*** 
 (6.90) (2.23) (1.87) (-8.31) (3.80) (6.91) (2.25) (1.90) (-8.34) (3.82) 
SdUnempSt -0.000108*** -0.203** -0.165** 0.0000991*** -3.164** -0.000112*** -0.207** -0.165** 0.000100*** -3.183** 
 (-2.83) (-2.36) (-2.04) (4.28) (-2.40) (-2.93) (-2.41) (-2.04) (4.32) (-2.41) 
EQUITY 0.0451*** 17.79*** -1.071 -0.00539*** 627.6*** 0.0447*** 17.53*** -1.069 -0.00543*** 630.0*** 
 (21.57) (5.38) (-0.37) (-4.79) (10.97) (21.30) (5.31) (-0.37) (-4.83) (11.03) 
LIQUID_RISK -0.000187 -1.260 -0.688 0.00101*** -28.63* -0.000337 -1.361 -0.657 0.00101*** -28.44* 
 (-0.38) (-1.29) (-0.75) (3.28) (-1.85) (-0.68) (-1.40) (-0.72) (3.32) (-1.85) 
CREDIT_RISK -0.274*** -204.3*** -189.3***   -0.274*** -204.2*** -189.3***   
 (-24.13) (-16.27) (-14.98)   (-24.13) (-16.26) (-14.98)   
Constant 0.00763*** 9.642*** 10.71*** 0.00150*** 96.55*** 0.00849*** 10.06*** 11.12*** 0.00138*** 97.56*** 
 (12.22) (7.91) (9.32) (4.02) (5.02) (13.77) (8.69) (10.17) (3.87) (5.32) 
Other control           
Time effects           
N 69911 50020 48271 57535 57524 69911 50020 48271 57535 57524 
N 6272 6150 6135 6215 6213 6272 6150 6135 6215 6213 
R2 0.266 0.0386 0.0350 0.0435 0.0260 0.266 0.0386 0.0352 0.0437 0.0261 
Marginal effect .0048649 2.783368     5.908273 7.020246 -.0015326  
z-statistic 7.87*** 1.99**     1.85* 2.26** -1.89*  
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Table 4: Geographic diversification and bank size (1994 – 2008) 
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model when including only geographic diversification index and its squared-value across three sub-samples of bank size 
(small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B  < TA < $50B); very large banks (TA ≥ $50B) from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of 
geographic diversification (GEODIV). Explained variables are ROA, SdROA, RaROA, RaROE and Z. GD1 measures intrastate diversification and GD2 measures interstate 
diversification. Other variables: other explanatory and control variables presented in section 3.5. N: number of observations; n: number of banks; Marginal effect: when 
significant non-linear effects are captured by our estimations, the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic 
diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index. R2: adjusted R squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
Small banks (TA ≤ $1B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00726*** 6.126*** 4.327** -0.00121* 46.55 0.00552** 1.264 -0.982 -0.000802 -74.27 
 (7.25) (2.75) (1.99) (-1.87) (1.40) (2.26) (0.25) (-0.20) (-0.46) (-0.84) 
GEODIV² -0.00594*** -6.275** -3.083 0.000589 -28.82 -0.00281 7.593 12.60 -0.000788 284.9 
 (-4.62) (-2.17) (-1.05) (0.68) (-0.66) (-0.56) (0.67) (1.18) (-0.20) (1.37) 
SIZE 0.00189*** 1.347*** 1.063*** -0.000464*** 16.01*** 0.00173*** 1.122*** 0.977*** -0.000440*** 14.69*** 
 (11.13) (4.72) (4.11) (-4.32) (3.51) (11.04) (4.13) (3.91) (-4.41) (3.40) 
Constant 0.00765*** 8.826*** 10.66*** 0.00160*** 82.56*** 0.00857*** 9.642*** 11.28*** 0.00143*** 90.84*** 
 (11.80) (7.10) (9.15) (4.17) (4.23) (13.33) (8.16) (10.16) (3.86) (4.84) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 67287 48165 46444 55286 55266 67287 48165 46444 55286 55266 
N 6133 5948 5937 6018 6017 6133 5948 5937 6018 6017 
R2 0.264 0.0379 0.0337 0.0426 0.0260 0.264 0.0377 0.0338 0.0426 0.0260 
Marginal effect .0057281 4.427658         
z-statistic 8.02*** 2.89***         
 
Large banks ($1B < TA < $50B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00311 -7.499 3.491 -0.000433 -120.2 -0.00329 1.950 6.632 -0.000375 181.7 
 (0.99) (-0.77) (0.35) (-0.21) (-0.77) (-1.19) (0.21) (0.92) (-0.23) (1.55) 
GEODIV² -0.00334 9.131 -1.081 0.00167 88.14 0.00132 -12.72 -12.56 0.00215 -311.4* 
 (-1.08) (0.87) (-0.11) (0.77) (0.55) (0.42) (-1.09) (-1.28) (1.11) (-1.85) 
SIZE -0.0000401 -0.239 0.659 0.0000173 -15.80 0.000112 0.629 1.080 0.000120 -14.01 
 (-0.07) (-0.15) (0.45) (0.04) (-0.82) (0.19) (0.43) (0.85) (0.35) (-0.80) 
Constant 0.00930*** 8.057 -7.106 0.00150 81.03 0.00931*** 5.211 -7.467 0.00123 62.12 
 (2.73) (0.80) (-0.70) (0.54) (0.55) (2.88) (0.55) (-0.80) (0.47) (0.44) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 2481 1744 1719 2123 2132 2481 1744 1719 2123 2132 
N 421 390 387 408 410 421 390 387 408 410 
R2 0.463 0.0812 0.108 0.154 0.0572 0.465 0.0841 0.110 0.153 0.0596 
Marginal effect           
z-statistic           
 
(Table 4 continued on the next page) 
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Table 4 continued 
Very large banks (TA ≥ $50B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV -0.00591 42.87 137.4*** -0.0117 780.4 0.0289 75.11 187.7*** -0.00924 986.0 
 (-0.65) (0.93) (3.54) (-0.95) (1.57) (1.31) (1.68) (2.97) (-0.73) (1.37) 
GEODIV² 0.0135 -44.07 -98.08** 0.0183* -796.3* -0.0255 -59.26 -152.0*** 0.0111 -924.1 
 (1.07) (-1.09) (-2.60) (1.73) (-1.73) (-1.41) (-1.54) (-3.00) (1.21) (-1.56) 
SIZE -0.000917 4.052 7.045 -0.000955 141.3** 0.000102 2.286 8.243* -0.000283 139.0** 
 (-0.55) (0.90) (1.37) (-0.57) (2.15) (0.08) (0.52) (1.79) (-0.19) (2.28) 
Constant -0.00282 -72.96 -138.9 0.0200 -2120.4* -0.0143 -68.87 -152.8 0.0128 -1973.2* 
 (-0.20) (-0.70) (-1.40) (0.86) (-2.07) (-1.21) (-0.78) (-1.72) (0.69) (-2.05) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 143 111 108 126 126 143 111 108 126 126 
n 23 22 20 23 23 23 22 20 23 23 
R2 0.490 0.294 0.282 0.300 0.269 0.491 0.294 0.318 0.284 0.332 
Marginal effect   -13.11071     -12.0903   
z-statistic   -0.44     -0.64   
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Table 5 Geographic diversification and disparities in economic conditions within and across states 
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV). Explained variables are 
ROA, SdROA, RaROA, RaROE and Z. Each measure of geographic diversification is interacted with our measure of economic disparities (SDUNEMP). GD1 measures intrastate diversification and 
GD2 measures interstate diversification. GD1 is interacted with our measure of economic disparities within state (SdUnempSt) and GD2 is interacted with our measure of interstate economic 
disparities (SdUnempCtry). Other control: other control variables presented in section 3.5. N: number of observations; n: number of banks; Marginal effect: when significant non-linear effects are 
captured by our estimations, the marginal effect is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of 
the geographic diversification index and of the economic disparities variable. R2: adjusted R squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in 
Table 1.1.  
 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00341*** 6.884*** 6.834*** -0.00105 60.51 0.0128*** 5.011 7.753 -0.00248 -30.63 
 (3.18) (2.61) (2.85) (-1.53) (1.59) (3.51) (0.42) (0.73) (-1.16) (-0.16) 
GEODIV² -0.00434*** -8.897** -8.584*** 0.000957 -80.98 -0.0155** -2.950 -22.38 0.00438 21.01 
 (-3.09) (-2.43) (-2.60) (1.07) (-1.58) (-2.42) (-0.13) (-1.10) (1.09) (0.06) 
SIZE -0.000125 0.961*** 0.729*** -0.000309*** 7.632* -0.000202* 0.834*** 0.742*** -0.000303*** 7.583* 
 (-1.12) (3.47) (2.88) (-3.13) (1.75) (-1.95) (3.19) (3.06) (-3.25) (1.87) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP -0.000778** -1.475* -1.438* -0.0000286 -22.00** -0.00898*** 1.164 -0.540 0.000593 69.66 
 (-2.44) (-1.77) (-1.96) (-0.15) (-1.97) (-3.55) (0.14) (-0.07) (0.38) (0.53) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP 0.000252 2.268* 2.648** 0.0000273 33.99** 0.00895** -7.049 7.307 -0.000516 -114.7 
 (0.59) (1.68) (2.32) (0.11) (1.97) (2.04) (-0.43) (0.51) (-0.18) (-0.50) 
INCOME -0.000870* -4.827*** -4.881*** 0.00198*** -73.50*** -0.000889* -4.926*** -4.904*** 0.00199*** -74.02*** 
 (-1.68) (-5.47) (-5.82) (6.48) (-5.55) (-1.72) (-5.60) (-5.88) (6.53) (-5.61) 
FOREIGN 0.00130 -5.772 -0.301 0.00548* -37.46 0.000946 -8.476 -1.473 0.00618** -66.15 
 (0.34) (-1.10) (-0.06) (1.96) (-0.72) (0.25) (-1.40) (-0.27) (2.11) (-1.20) 
LOAN -0.00181*** -0.0430 0.0905 -0.000139 -3.393 -0.00185*** -0.162 -0.0204 -0.000131 -4.657 
 (-3.49) (-0.05) (0.10) (-0.44) (-0.22) (-3.57) (-0.17) (-0.02) (-0.42) (-0.31) 
GROWTH 0.00730*** 2.521** 1.951* -0.00205*** 69.17*** 0.00735*** 2.522** 1.959* -0.00206*** 69.07*** 
 (16.35) (2.25) (1.89) (-8.31) (3.82) (16.42) (2.25) (1.89) (-8.34) (3.82) 
SdUnempSt 0.000273*** -0.165* -0.163* 0.000101*** -2.593* 0.000176*** -0.207** -0.165** 0.000100*** -3.179** 
 (6.58) (-1.69) (-1.79) (3.76) (-1.79) (4.75) (-2.41) (-2.05) (4.32) (-2.41) 
EQUITY 0.0347*** 17.84*** -0.892 -0.00540*** 628.6*** 0.0345*** 17.47*** -0.995 -0.00542*** 630.0*** 
 (17.74) (5.39) (-0.30) (-4.79) (10.98) (17.57) (5.29) (-0.34) (-4.82) (11.02) 
LIQUID_RISK 0.00297*** -1.250 -0.671 0.00101*** -28.41* 0.00291*** -1.373 -0.640 0.00101*** -28.56* 
 (6.07) (-1.28) (-0.73) (3.28) (-1.83) (5.97) (-1.41) (-0.70) (3.32) (-1.86) 
CREDIT_RISK -0.279*** -204.2*** -189.3***   -0.278*** -204.2*** -189.4***   
 (-24.05) (-16.24) (-14.95)   (-24.00) (-16.26) (-14.98)   
Constant 0.00438*** 8.934*** 9.962*** 0.00196*** 85.54*** 0.00476*** 9.417*** 10.43*** 0.00185*** 87.78*** 
 (6.90) (7.33) (8.65) (5.23) (4.41) (7.60) (8.15) (9.53) (5.15) (4.75) 
Other control           
Time effects           
N 69911 50020 48271 57535 57524 69911 50020 48271 57535 57524 
n 6272 6150 6135 6215 6213 6272 6150 6135 6215 6213 
R2 0.239 0.0387 0.0353 0.0435 0.0261 0.239 0.0386 0.0352 0.0437 0.0261 
Marginal effect .0007037 2.63126 2.954874  12.67673 -.0005347     
z-statistic 1.17 1.88* 2.25**  0.60 -0.37     
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Table 6: Geographic diversification and disparities in economic conditions within and across states: estimations across bank size  
This table reports the regression results of our baseline model from fixed-effects models using GD1 and GD2 respectively as measure of geographic diversification (GEODIV) across different sub-sample 
of bank size (small banks (TA ≤ $1B); large banks ($1B  < TA < $50B); very large banks (TA ≥ $50B). Explained variables are ROA, SdROA, RaROA, RaROE and Z. Each measure of geographic 
diversification is interacted with our measure of economic disparities (SDUNEMP). GD1 measures intrastate diversification and GD2 measures interstate diversification. GD1 is interacted with our 
measure of economic disparities within state (SdUnempSt) and GD2 is interacted with our measure of interstate economic disparities (SdUnempCtry). Other variables: other explanatory and control 
variables presented in section 3.5. N: number of observations; n: number of banks; Marginal effect: Marginal effect: when significant non-linear effects are captured by our estimations, the marginal effect 
is calculated as the first derivative of the explained variable with respect to the geographic diversification index computed using the average value of the geographic diversification index and of the 
economic disparities variable. R2: adjusted R squared. t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All other variables are defined in Table 1.1. 
 
Small banks (TA ≤ $ 1B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00370*** 7.245*** 4.671* -0.000769 61.50 0.0212*** 8.691 21.85 0.00150 317.8 
 (2.97) (2.65) (1.79) (-1.05) (1.44) (3.11) (0.46) (1.24) (0.41) (0.91) 
GEODIV² -0.00456** -7.578** -3.477 -0.0000748 -42.18 -0.0393** -11.86 -38.41 -0.00467 -798.7 
 (-2.54) (-2.02) (-0.93) (-0.07) (-0.67) (-2.45) (-0.29) (-0.94) (-0.54) (-0.97) 
SIZE -0.0000589 1.336*** 1.060*** -0.000466*** 15.83*** -0.000133 1.121*** 0.970*** -0.000441*** 14.67*** 
 (-0.47) (4.68) (4.10) (-4.34) (3.47) (-1.14) (4.12) (3.88) (-4.41) (3.39) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP -0.000709* -0.563 -0.172 -0.000231 -7.348 -0.0153*** -5.585 -17.01 -0.00170 -294.7 
 (-1.84) (-0.68) (-0.21) (-1.12) (-0.53) (-3.23) (-0.41) (-1.32) (-0.62) (-1.25) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP 0.000205 0.582 0.175 0.000326 5.180 0.0278** 14.56 37.76 0.00281 810.7 
 (0.34) (0.44) (0.13) (1.05) (0.22) (2.48) (0.48) (1.26) (0.46) (1.47) 
Constant 0.00402*** 8.226*** 10.03*** 0.00200*** 73.14*** 0.00447*** 9.130*** 10.69*** 0.00185*** 83.11*** 
 (6.10) (6.61) (8.59) (5.18) (3.71) (6.85) (7.75) (9.64) (4.95) (4.40) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 67287 48165 46444 55286 55266 67287 48165 46444 55286 55266 
N 6133 5948 5937 6018 6017 6133 5948 5937 6018 6017 
R2 0.237 0.0379 0.0337 0.0426 0.0260 0.236 0.0377 0.0338 0.0425 0.0261 
Marginal effect .0011553 4.393851    -.0014434     
z-statistic 1.67* 2.87***    -0.58     
 
 
 
 
(Table 6 continued on the next page) 
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Table 6 continued 
Large banks ($1B < TA < $50B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV 0.00511 11.69 12.53 -0.00692** 113.0 -0.00669 -8.298 -42.56* -0.00536 -114.3 
 (1.18) (0.77) (0.92) (-2.24) (0.57) (-1.05) (-0.29) (-1.68) (-1.04) (-0.26) 
GEODIV² -0.00788* -18.20 -17.66 0.00938*** -207.5 0.00392 16.72 59.15 0.0101 415.8 
 (-1.79) (-1.08) (-1.25) (2.69) (-1.01) (0.41) (0.36) (1.39) (1.18) (0.54) 
SIZE -0.00104** -0.00770 0.839 0.00000430 -14.07 -0.000804** 0.516 1.069 0.000110 -15.82 
 (-2.58) (-0.00) (0.59) (0.01) (-0.72) (-1.97) (0.36) (0.85) (0.32) (-0.90) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP -0.00272* -10.89* -4.950 0.00383*** -137.9* 0.000148 7.898 35.31** 0.00358 223.6 
 (-1.72) (-1.88) (-0.99) (2.63) (-1.68) (0.04) (0.41) (2.07) (1.01) (0.74) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP 0.00279* 14.54** 8.971* -0.00418*** 161.7** -0.00145 -22.70 -50.65* -0.00565 -547.6 
 (1.85) (2.42) (1.81) (-3.08) (2.20) (-0.23) (-0.70) (-1.71) (-0.93) (-1.06) 
Constant 0.0106*** 3.358 -9.234 0.00315 4.101 0.0105*** 0.706 -11.14 0.00252 -2.854 
 (3.15) (0.32) (-0.88) (1.10) (0.03) (3.29) (0.07) (-1.15) (0.93) (-0.02) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 2481 1744 1719 2123 2132 2481 1744 1719 2123 2132 
N 421 390 387 408 410 421 390 387 408 410 
R2 0.457 0.0907 0.117 0.163 0.0595 0.459 0.0839 0.113 0.153 0.0603 
Marginal effect -.0027052 -.9260718  .0018823 -57.5614   2.067765   
z-statistic -1.53 -0.16  1.58   -1.00   0.40   
Very large banks (TA ≥ $ 50B) 
 Intrastate diversification Interstate diversification 
 ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z ROA RaROA RaROE SdROA Z 
GEODIV -0.00864 38.26 131.4* -0.0244* 983.0 0.0592 137.8 469.6** -0.155*** 1172.9 
 (-0.84) (0.96) (1.89) (-1.82) (1.44) (1.50) (0.88) (2.57) (-3.86) (0.72) 
GEODIV² 0.0111 -39.96 -100.0 0.0298** -1037.3 -0.0707* -83.06 -385.5** 0.136*** -480.6 
 (0.79) (-1.01) (-1.57) (2.18) (-1.55) (-1.84) (-0.57) (-2.29) (3.57) (-0.30) 
SIZE -0.000567 4.051 7.580 -0.00102 146.1* 0.000440 3.031 12.03** -0.00239* 139.9** 
 (-0.35) (0.77) (1.25) (-0.57) (2.07) (0.41) (0.55) (2.49) (-1.81) (2.13) 
GEODIV*SDUNEMP 0.0143** 4.051 11.23 0.0108 -118.8 -0.0109 -58.03 -200.5* 0.103*** -495.6 
 (2.42) (0.10) (0.24) (1.41) (-0.39) (-0.68) (-0.49) (-1.94) (3.84) (-0.55) 
GEODIV²*SDUNEMP -0.00959* -3.482 -7.070 -0.00939 127.0 0.0225 28.00 169.5 -0.0891*** 4.347 
 (-2.04) (-0.11) (-0.18) (-1.43) (0.49) (1.22) (0.25) (1.72) (-3.60) (0.00) 
Constant 0.00309 -71.35 -139.0 0.0245 -2178.6** -0.0167* -69.77 -154.8 0.0195 -1895.1* 
 (0.26) (-0.68) (-1.36) (1.10) (-2.11) (-1.93) (-0.74) (-1.54) (1.14) (-1.81) 
Other variables           
Time effects           
N 143 111 108 126 126 143 111 108 126 126 
n 23 22 20 23 23 23 22 20 23 23 
R2 0.509 0.276 0.267 0.292 0.256 0.510 0.305 0.351 0.423 0.368 
Marginal effect .0084829   .0166175    -4.843855 .0037574  
z-statistic 0.63   2.07**    -0.26 0.98  
 
